Abstract
inconvenience.
1 Thus, territoriality withstands the test of time and the changing structure of the international community. Originally devised as the most natural corollary of the co-existence of a plurality of sovereign entities, that principle has exhibited an unusual capacity to adapt itself to the evolving international landscape and to an ever more interdependent world.
Restrictive Extraterritoriality vs. Expansive Extraterritoriality
The prohibition of extraterritorial jurisdiction thus constitutes a limit to the expansive use of states' public authority. Absent a special title of jurisdiction, a state cannot enact laws designed to govern individual conduct abroad or adopt measures of enforcement beyond its boundaries.
There is, however, a different way of looking at extraterritoriality. This way emerges when the law applied to extraterritorially does not aim to govern the conduct of individuals on the territory of other states, but rather to limit this expansive use of jurisdiction. In such a case, extraterritorial application of the law has a defensive character as it purports to externalize the same limits which states' action encounters domestically.
Restrictive extraterritoriality thus appears to be profoundly different from the traditional paradigm. Far from imposing values and interests overseas, it rather tends to limit this claim. It highlights the bright side of extraterritoriality, as an antidote to its most pernicious aspect. It does not outlaw extraterritoriality but simply cures some of its unwarranted effect.
This paradigm appears particularly useful when human rights are at stake. 2 The assumption that human rights constitute a limit to other, and most aggressive, forms of extraterritoriality can be based on the consideration that the function of human rights is precisely to curtail and to corrall the scope of public authority. The logic of fundamental human rights is not to accord to individuals selective protection, ratione loci, but rather to reduce the unfettered discretion of public authority. Limiting their effect to a definite geographical space, or to pre-determined conditions of application, would subvert the logic and the very raison d'être of the sphere of fundamental rights pertaining to individuals. treaties to determine the scope of the obligations imposed on the states parties. 4 Initially conceived of in strict territorial terms, referring to the sphere where states' functions are exercised with a certain degree of stability, it is gradually losing that territorial connotation and it is more and more characterized in functional terms, as a notion which links the scope of human rights to the exercise of a state's public authority, be it lawful or unlawful, permanent or occasional. 5 The detachment of the notion of jurisdiction from its original territory-based meaning appears particularly appropriate in the field of human rights. If the scope of states' authority were determined by a non-territorial test, the same test should correspondingly determine the scope of their obligations to respect human rights.
In the EU domestic system, the enlargement of the scope of human rights is further imposed by Articles 3(5) and 21 TUE, which establish the promotion, or even the protection, of human rights as a foreign policy directive. In the next section, the role of these two provisions will be explored, with regard to the three classes of situations identified by Lorand Bartels, namely: extraterritorial conduct, extraterritorial effects of domestic conduct; extraterritorial conduct by other actors. 6 The analysis will show that these two provisions do not add much to the normative value and effect of EU and of international human rights law. Due to restraints flowing from the founding treaties, Articles 3(5) and 21 do not provide a sufficient legal basis for EU action designed to protect human rights overseas.
Human Rights as a Shield for EU Extraterritorial Conduct
With regard to extraterritorial conduct this conclusion appears to be self-explanatory. It flows from the approach suggested above, which pleads for a coincidence between the scope of human rights and the scope of states' public authority. Regardless of the place where conduct is performed, executive actions by EU Institutions -a rare occurrence, indeed -or by Member States' organs implementing EU law, would be limited by the full panoply of human rights which apply to domestic conduct, be it of domestic or international origin. The defensive function assigned to human rights, which would consequently apply to every possible action of the Institutions and of the Member States within the scope of application of EU law, should make it superfluous to have recourse to the extraterritorial shield offered by Articles 3(5), and 21 TUE.
Analogous conclusions should be drawn with regard to the second class of situations, whereby actions performed domestically by the EU, or by the Member States in implementing EU law, can ultimately exacerbate the situation of fundamental rights of people outside its boundaries: by increasing poverty, reducing access to food or medicine, and so forth.
To clarify this point, a distinction between direct and indirect causes of the violation of human rights is in order.
It seems safe to assume, first of all, that human rights obligations also cover domestic actions resulting in direct violations of human rights abroad, such as embargos on food or medicines adopted and carried out in the awareness that they will result in the death or grave suffering of a person or of a group of persons. This consequence can be accommodated in the doctrine on the effet utile of human rights. As early as in 1988, the European Court of Human Rights found that 'the object and purpose of the Convention as an instrument for the protection of individual human beings require that its provisions be interpreted and applied so as to make its safeguards practical and effective'.
7 The obligation to protect human rights in a 'practical and effective' way applies nowadays to a much broader range of situations, from the obligation to abstain from actions taken in the awareness that they will probably result in a violation of human rights by another entity, 8 to the obligation to take actions within the state's territory to prevent violations from occurring outside that territory. 9 In this context, it does not seem that Articles 3(5) and 21 add much to the normative content, which can be extracted from domestic or from international human rights law.
To take an example drawn from the recent legislative practice of the EU, one can genuinely believe that a prohibition on trading in guillotines and other goods which could be used for capital punishment, torture, or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, imposed by Council Regulation (EC 10 Although these measures undoubtedly pursue a human rights purpose, they do not need a specific human rights legal basis and can be reasonably deemed to fall within the general competence of the EU to regulate foreign trade. The reason lies in the fact that human rights constitute a limit to the whole set of the competences possessed by the EU, that cannot be exercised if their exercise results in a violation of human rights. It follows that the EU, acting under its competence in the field of commercial policy, has the duty to determine the goods, trade in which must be prohibited in order to avoid the free trade regime violating its obligations to protect human rights in a 'practical and effective' way.
On the contrary, the EU can hardly be held responsible for violations of human rights occurring beyond its borders as an indirect consequence of conduct performed by its Institutions within its boundaries. Neither under Soering and its progeny, nor under the general law of international responsibility, can a violation of human rights be attributed to an entity when such violation, although prompted by the initial conduct of that entity, constitutes the ultimate and unforeseeable product of a chain of events unfolding outside its control.
Is the EU under the Obligation to Ensure Respect for Human Rights Worldwide?
Extraterritorial application of human rights, beyond the paradigm referred to above, entails stepping on the insidious ground of extraterritoriality in the strict sense, namely, in Lorand Bartels' words, of 'the obligation to "protect" the human rights of persons from the activities of other actors, and of the obligation to "fulfil" the human rights of those persons'.
11
International human rights law does not, in principle, impose active obligations to protect human rights against the conduct of other actors. Such an obligation can flow from special rules of international law. Apparently, this is the case with common Article 1 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol I, which requires the parties to respect and to ensure respect for humanitarian law in all circumstances.
12
Arguably this provision directs the parties to carry out extraterritorial actions with a view to protecting human rights and to preventing their violation. However, it is silent on the means through which this objective ought to be attained and, thus, it is particularly difficult to determine its normative content. Absent an indication to the contrary, the mere existence of an obligation to ensure respect for human rights can hardly condone actions which prove to be illegal under international law. Certainly it does not impose executive actions in order to substitute for the defaulting state in discharging its conventional obligations.
With strict regard to the obligation to prevent genocide, prescribed by Article I of the Genocide Convention, the ICJ famously said that such an obligation 'is both normative and compelling'. 13 In the same paragraph the Court pointed out that a state which fulfils this obligation must respect 'the United Nations Charter and any decisions that may have been taken by its competent organs'. In more general terms, a few 11 Bartels, supra note 6, at 1074. 14 Arguably, Articles 3(5) and 21 TUE produce analogous effects, albeit from a purely domestic perspective. By virtue of these two provisions, the EU is under an obligation to ensure respect for human rights worldwide, in the sense that its action must tend to promote and protect human rights, without being restricted to a particular geographical or functional sphere. However, the means used to attain this objective must be consistent with international law. After all, respect for international law is included in the set of the objectives laid down by the same provisions. One can hardly assume that the EU is empowered to pursue one of these objectives to the detriment of others.
Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights and the Limits of the EU Competence
The capacity to protect human rights worldwide, however, could be further impaired by the limits to EU action under the founding Treaties.
In spite of the broad set of objectives laid down by Articles 3(5) and 21, these two provisions do not confer new competences on the EU. As if to play down the innovative character of Article 3(5), Article 3(6) points out that '[t]he Union shall pursue its objectives by appropriate means commensurate with the competences which are conferred upon it in the Treaties'. In analogous terms, Article 21(3) indicates that the objectives of Article 21(1) and (2) will be pursued through 'the development and implementation of the different areas of the Union's external action covered by this Title and by Part Five of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and of the external aspects of its other policies'.
This limitation considerably curtails the set of means at the disposal of the Union to protect human rights beyond its boundaries. For example, the EU does not possess the competence to conclude human rights treaties and, therefore, to acquire the status of party to these treaties, which would confer on it the ability to require compliance by the other parties.
Nor can it be said that, in spite of the non-existence of a new competence, this objective can nonetheless be pursued by each of the policies that come within the external action of the Union. This conclusion would have required that the means of action which are conferred to the EU under the different areas of external action and under the external aspects of its other policies could be used unconditionally for the pursuit of political objectives.
In this perspective, the EU would be regarded as an entity empowered to use all its competence to attain its political objectives. Such a conclusion can be hardly drawn from the incoherent and fragmentary system of the EU's external relations. The combined reading of Articles 23 and 40 TUE seems to point to a different direction. Article 23 assigns the pursuit of the political objectives laid down by Article 21(1) and (2) to the primary competence of the CFSP. 15 Article 40 TUE prevents the other EU substantive policies from autonomously pursuing the objectives of the CFSP.
